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￿Globalized￿ workers enjoy a riskier, but potentially more rewarding, menu
of labor market outcomes. This, so far overlooked, feature of globalization is
documented here for a sample of Indian manufacturing ￿rms. Firms subject
to external exposure, be they exporting, import-competing or foreign-owned,
indeed face higher earnings variability and job insecurity. At the same time,
though, the employees of foreign-owned and import-competing ￿rms are more
frequently involved in training programs than employees of ￿rms not subject
to foreign competition. Similarly, the employees of exporting ￿rms are pro-
moted more frequently than otherwise. The ￿bad￿ and the ￿good￿ labor market
eﬀects of globalization are thus twin to each other. Concentrating on just
one side of the coin gives a misleading picture of globalization.1 Introduction
￿Globalized￿ workers enjoy a riskier, but potentially more rewarding, menu
of labor market outcomes. This, so far overlooked, feature of globalization is
documented here for a sample of Indian manufacturing ￿rms. Firms subject
to external exposure, be they exporting, import-competing or foreign-owned,
indeed exhibit higher earnings variability and job insecurity. At the same
time, though, the employees of foreign-owned and import-competing ￿rms
are more frequently involved in training programs than employees of ￿rms not
subject to foreign competition. Similarly, the employees of exporting ￿rms
are promoted more frequently than otherwise. The ￿bad￿ and the ￿good￿ labor
market eﬀects of globalization are thus twin to each other. Concentrating on
just one side of the coin gives a misleading picture of globalization.
Critics of globalization have often argued that increased openness under-
mines labor market institutions, raising job insecurity and the variability of
earnings. When barriers to trade and capital fall, ￿rms￿ demand for labor
becomes more elastic and ￿uctuates more, as closer substitutes for ￿rms￿
products become available. This is associated to higher earnings variability.
As the implicit/explicit insurance granted to workers by formal labor con-
tracts breaks down, risk-averse workers may end up worse oﬀ than before
the economy was opened up. In rich countries, trade integration has in fact
been blamed for (part of) the rise of wage inequality and unemployment in
Industrial countries in the 1980s (e.g. see the selective surveys of the main
issues in Wood (1994, 1998)).
In principle, the reasons for concern about the eﬀects of globalization
are less apparent for poor countries. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem sug-
gests that trade integration should raise real wages in labor abundant coun-
tries and therefore wage inequality should go down, not up, when poor
economies are opened up. Moreover, ￿globalized￿ workers may bene￿tf r o m
faster growth and the quality upgrading of goods and endowments, induced
by scale economies, technology transfers and knowledge spillovers. On the
negative side, in addition to higher job insecurity, there may be a trade-oﬀ
between static and dynamic gains from trade, if the specialization brought
about by the opening up occurs in traditional, less growth-promoting, sec-
tors. Finally, if the supply response of domestic producers on the export side
lags behind, the static welfare gains may be smaller than expected and im-
ports may boom early on, with unwelcome disruption eﬀects on the domestic
market. The potential shortcomings of globalization in the Third World have
been most clearly and forcefully expressed in Rodrik (1997), among others.
In this paper we present new evidence on the labor market eﬀects of
globalization, with an emphasis on the presence of non-wage bene￿ts such as
1training and promotions, something neglected in previous studies. We do so
using a newly assembled data set of Indian manufacturing ￿rms in 1997-99.
Before describing the evidence, the main links between globalization, un-
certainty and the labor market are illustrated within a simple eﬃciency-wage
model in Section 2. In our model, globalization is a mean-preserving increase
in the variability of wages and productivity. The eﬀort-rewarding incentive
scheme in the model is associated to more equilibrium eﬀo r t( t r a i n i n g )o n
the part of the workers, more promotions and hiring of skilled workers on the
part of the ￿rm. These implications are then tested in the empirical part of
the paper.
India in the late 1990s is an ideal laboratory to look at to learn about
these issues. As more extensively described in Section 3, in 1991-92 India
undertook major steps towards the reduction of barriers to trade in goods
and capital, following a long period of import-substitution policies dating
back to the 1950s. Between 1993 and 1997 the average tariﬀ rate halved, the
number of ￿strategic￿ industries was drastically cut, and former restrictions
on inward foreign investment partly lifted.As a consequence of these reforms,
throughout this period of time, imports boomed, while exports continued to
grow at a fast pace, but unchanged compared to the recent past. Our newly
assembled World Bank data set of Indian manufacturing ￿rms in 1997-99
employed here provides a timely snapshot of opportunities and constraints
brought about by trade reform in a large, previously closed, country.
In Section 4, to capture the overall eﬀects of globalization, ￿rms are clas-
si￿ed into ￿exposed￿ to or ￿protected￿ from foreign competition. In turn,
the former competes either in the foreign market (￿exporters￿) or in the do-
mestic market (￿import competitors￿). Some of them may also be (at least
partially) ￿foreign-owned￿. Hence, ￿rms are classi￿ed according to their ex-
tent of external exposure in both product and capital markets. Then, in the
same Section, several features of the various groups of ￿rms are contrasted
through equality-of-group-means tests. Our data expectedly replicate rel-
atively well-known features of globalization episodes. Both exporters and
non-exporters subject to foreign competition face higher variability of prices,
sales, and pro￿ts, as well as, to a lesser extent, of wages and employment
than protected ￿r m s .T h es a m ea p p l i e st of o r e i g n - o w n e d￿rms. This stronger
exposure to variability comes from a relatively higher incidence of external
shocks in ￿globalized￿ ￿rms. The share of skilled workers is also higher both
in exporting and foreign-owned ￿rms, while no statistically signi￿cant diﬀer-
ences emerge instead for absolute and relative wages and employment levels
between exporters, import competitors and protected ￿rms (the skill pre-
mium is higher in foreign owned than in domestically owned ￿rms, though).
Hence our data recon￿rm that globalization raises earnings variability over
2time and across groups. This is not all, however. Globalization also brings
about bene￿ts, whose intensity diﬀers across exporting and import compet-
ing ￿rms.Workers employed in exporting ￿rms tend to be more often involved
in promotions than other workers. Unusually high involvement in training
programs, inside or outside the ￿rm, is instead enjoyed by workers employed
in import-competiting and foreign-owned ￿rms. These additional, less inves-
tigated but not less important, eﬀects of globalization must be counted on
the plus side to achieve a balanced view of what globalization is about.
In Section 5, we check whether the implications of the model in Section
2 and the results from the unconditional means tests in Section 4 survive
upon conditioning our variables of interest to some sector and state spe-
ci￿c dummies, as well as to other equation-speci￿c conditioning variables,
such as productivity growth and tax incentives for training and productivity
growth for promotions.Standard multivariate regression analysis as well as
non-parametric methods of estimation indicate that the ￿ndings in Section
4 usually withstand the inclusion of such controls.
Parametric (OLS, probit) estimates show that variability, training and
promotions indeed depend on each ￿rm￿s foreign exposure status. Workers
and ￿rms are exposed by foreign competition to higher uncertainty (in par-
ticular over sales, pro￿ts and prices). Workers in foreign-owned and import-
competing ￿rms bene￿tf r o mm o r et r a i n i n g . W o r k e r si ne x p o r t i n g￿rms
bene￿t from more promotions.
Our results (particularly those on promotions) are weaker when location
dummies are appended, however. This may be due to collinearity between
the sector or location dummies and the foreign exposure variables. Foreign
exposure is in fact itself likely aﬀected by sector and geographical factors,
which makes the linearity assumption involved in parametric estimations
possibly unduly restrictive. Non-parametric (matching) estimates indicate
that this may indeed be the case. The results from matching corroborate,
and even reinforce, our previous ￿ndings: variability and training are usually
higher in exporting and import-competing ￿rms than in protected ￿rms at
conventional signi￿cance levels. The results on promotions remain rather
weak, instead.
Section 6 concludes.
32 A model of globalisation, uncertainty and
the labor market
Here we develop a simple partial equilibrium model where the eﬀects of un-
certainty on workers￿ and ￿rms￿ behavior are modeled. We can think of
￿globalisation￿ as adding to workers￿ variability of real income and to ￿rms￿
pro￿ts. For example, terms of trade shocks will have a larger impact on
real wages, the higher the share of imported goods in the consumption bas-
ket. We show that, if workers and ￿rms have limited access to the capital
market, the former will invest more in training and productivity in order
to protect themseves from real wage uncertainty, and the latter will try to
expand output in order to reduce the costs of uncertainty on pro￿ts.
The economy is made of two types of agents: an employee (the worker)
a n da ne m p l o y e r( t h e￿rm).The employee can work in two positions, high
a n dl o w ,w i t ht w ow a g er a t e s ,w ,a n dw+∆ >w , respectively. The wage w
is exogenously given and represents the worker￿ outside option (the marginal
utility of leisure). Promotions occur according to an incentive scheme, such
that the worker is promoted to the higher position if he/she undergoes train-
ing (i.e. exerts costly eﬀort). All income is consumed. Given the worker￿s
optimal supply of eﬀort, the ￿rm chooses how many workers to employ and
the best level of the premium ∆. There are two sources of uncertainty.
The worker faces shocks to the purchasing power of his/her wage, because of
terms of trade shocks. The ￿rm faces pro￿t uncertainty, due to productivity
shocks.
2.1 The Worker
The employee faces the wage rates, w ,a n dw+∆ , and an incentive scheme
whereby the probability of promotion, p, depends of his willingness to un-
d e r g ot r a i n i n ga n de x e r te ﬀort λ, and on a random variable ε ∼ (0,σ2
ε):
p = λ + ε (1)
Note that λ also represents the worker average productivity. Training is
costly, and the disutility of λ is C(λ)=
φ
2λ
2. The real wage w is subject to
(non insurable) aggregate risk, say due to terms of trade shocks, so that real
consumer wage rate is w+v (or w+v+∆) with v ∼ (0,σ2
v). Training is chosen
before the realization of the shock. With probability p t h ei sp r o m o t e da n d
earns w+v+∆ , while with probability (1−p) he is not promoted and earns
w + v. Therefore expected utility is





where u is a standard utility function , u0 > 0,u￿ < 0, satisfying the
Inada conditions. Taking a second-order Taylor expansion around v =0 ,U
can be proxied as:























Since the worker is risk-averse, u￿ < 0, uncertainty over the real wage reduces
welfare. The worker chooses λ in order to maximize the previous expression.













The optimal level of training (eﬀort) is directly proportional to the utility
gain fom higher income, and inversely to the eﬀort marginal cost, φ.The
eﬀect of wage uncertainty depends on how the attitude towards risk varies
with income. If we make the reasonable (and standard) assumption that
the individual suﬀers less from uncertainty when he becomes richer (i.e. we
assume decreasing absolute risk-aversion, requiring u000 > 0 1), then wage
uncertainty raises optimal training. The intuition is straightforward: faced
with more uncertainty, the worker is willing to increase its eﬀort because
when he earns more, he also reduces the costs of uncertainty.
2.2 The Firm
The ￿r mc h o o s e sh o wm a n yw o r k e r st oe m p l o ya n dt h eo p t i m a li n c e n t i v e
∆,taking workers￿ behavior Λ(∆;σ2
v) into account. The productivity of each
worker is stochastic and given by (1). Letting L represent the number of
workers, employment in eﬃciency units is L(λ+ε). Recalling that a fraction
λ of employees is paid w + ∆ and a fraction (1 − λ) is paid w, the ￿rms
pro￿ts are
π = F (L(λ + ε)) − L[λ(w + ∆)+( 1− λ)w]
= F (L(λ + ε)) − L[w + λ∆] (4)
1Most types of commonly used utiliuty function, including logaritmic, exponential,
stone-geary, show decreasing absolute risk aversion
5where F denotes a standard production function,F 0 > 0,F00 < 0.Before the
realization of the productivity shock the ￿rm chooses ∆ and L in order to
maximize expected pro￿ts. Proceeding as before, these can be approximated
by.

















where l = λL is labor in eﬃciency units. The ￿rm dislikes uncertainty the











This expression is a demand for labor, where the (risk corrected) marginal
product of labor (in eﬃciency units) is equalized to the average wage (always
expressed in eﬃciency units). Uncertainty raises labor demand if the cur-
vature of the production function falls as l rises (F000 > 0), and viceversa.
Intuitively, if this happens uncertainty is less costly the higher the ￿rm￿s
revenue2.This yields
e l = l(w,∆;σ
2
ε) (7)





where η(∆)=∆Λ0(.)/Λ is the elasticity of eﬀo r tw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h ew a g e
diﬀerential As in the standard eﬃciency wage model, the equality between
this and the (percentage) wage premium determines ∆. Given this, the
training supply schedule (3) detemines optimal training, while employment
is given by (7)with the identity e L = e l/e λ.
From simple comparative statics exercises it is easy to show that:
1 . Ar i s ei nw a g eu n c e r t a i n t y( σ2
ε) raises training (λ) without aﬀecting
employment and the wage premium (if u000 > 0)
2. A rise in productivity uncertainty (σ2
v) raises employment without
aﬀecting training and the wage premium (if F000 > 0)
2A simple exponential function F(l)=la,a<1 satis￿es this property.
62.3 Testable Implications
If uncertainty is higher the greater the exposure to international competion,
we expect
1. more ￿eﬀort￿ (training), but also more promotions in ￿rms that compete
internationally
2. larger ￿rms and larger shares of skilled workers in ￿rms that compete
internationally
3. similar wage premia
These implications are tested against actual data in the next sections.
3 Why India?
Opening up the economy enhances ￿rms￿ incentives to sell in the world mar-
ket and eﬃciently tackle the threat of foreign competitors in the domestic
market. India in the late 1990s is an ideal laboratory to study such eﬀects of
globalization on both types of ￿rms. On the one hand, the - still incomplete
- trade reform provided exporters with a less distorted environment than in
the past. On the other hand, the large size of India￿s domestic market made
the potential disruption potentially suﬀered by domestic producers a very
important policy issue. This Section is a short recollection of the evolution
of India￿s outward orientation policy.3
Since independence (1947), India has been characterized by active govern-
ment intervention aimed at fostering growth by substituting domestic indus-
trial production for imported goods. Over time, the economy became riddled
with prohibitively high tariﬀs and quantitative restrictions on imports and
industry-speci￿c licensing requirements for all investment projects beyond a
certain threshold. A number of ￿strategic￿ areas was reserved to public sector
enterprises, including large human and physical infrastructures. A restrictive
attitude towards FDI ￿ows, in particular towards those with little content
of technological transfer, developed, in parallel with persisting attempts of
promoting the development of local technology and eventually exporting ca-
pabilities well beyond traditional products.
In spite of much eﬀort, the perception that India￿s grand plan of substan-
tially raising manufactured productivity and exports had met with failure
was widespread already at the end of the 1970s. Excess protection was rec-
ognized as the main culprit of technological obsolescence, low product quality,
limited range and high costs, which made Indian goods non-competitive on
3This Section draws on World Bank (2000), International Monetary Fund (2001), World
Trade Organization (1998), Ministry of Finance of India (1999a,b).
7the world markets. Hence, in the 1980s, the Indian Government took the
￿rst gradual steps towards both a partial liberalization of imports of capital
goods and technology and a gradual exposure of Indian ￿rms to international
competition by reducing tariﬀs and quantitative restrictions on imports. In
parallel, FDI ￿ows and foreign licensing collaborations were also encouraged
by reducing tax rates on royalties and raising the maximum threshold of
foreign equity participation.
While these ￿rst reform attempts resulted in some bene￿cial eﬀects, their
overall results fell well short of expectations, particularly when compared to
analogous experiments in other Asian Newly Industrializing Countries. As
in other previous episodes throughout the world, a new push to reform was
triggered by the major balance of payments crisis undergone in 1990-91.
In June 1991, the newly elected Government initiated a major program
of economic reform and trade liberalization, with the support of the IMF and
the World Bank. Average tariﬀsw e r er e d u c e df r o m7 1p e rc e n ti n1 9 9 3t o3 5
per cent in 1997, although in several industries (paper and paper products,
wood, food, beverages and tobacco) the tariﬀ rates remain high. Considerable
steps towards a relaxation of non-tariﬀ barriers were also taken. The Indian
licensing process set up under the Eight Five Years Plan established that
products had ￿rst to be included in the Special Import License (SIL) list, with
producers being exposed to limited foreign competition. After this initial
period, then, the product could be moved to the list of freely importable
goods.
The NIP (New Industrial Policy) reduced the number of industries re-
served for public enterprises to eight and limited the application of the In-
dustrial Licensing System to eighteen strategic industries. More liberal legis-
lation concerning inward and outward FDI and joint ventures legislation was
also put in place by the NIP. Majoritarian participation of foreign equity
was allowed for high priority industries and exporting ￿rms. FDI propos-
als were also no longer required to be accompanied by technology transfer
agreements. A list of priority industries was also provided with automatic
approval of majoritarian foreign equity participation.
The ￿rst wave of reforms in the 1990s was clearly successful. In 1992-
1994, the growth of Indian GDP averaged 7% per year. The annual growth of
industrial production averaged 7% in 1992-1997, peaking to 12.8 per cent in
1995-96. The gradual trade liberalization in place provided further impulse
to thegroth of exports and imports. Imports grew by +25% per year in 1993-
96, a big jump from the 15% rate of the previous ￿ve years, while exports
grew in line with the previous period (also at a yearly rate of 25%). Finally,
private sector investment rose at an annual rate of 16.5% in 1993-96, up by
about two percentage point per year from the previous ￿ve years.
8After the growth peak in 1995-1996, the growth of industrial production
declined to 5.6% in 1996-1997. The average growth rate of exports slowed
down to 5.3 per cent in 1996-1997 and declined further in 1997-1998 (+1.5%).
Meanwhile, India￿s imports grew by only 6.7 per cent in 1996-1997 and by 4.2
per cent in 1997-1998. As a result, trade de￿cit substantially widened. This
was mostly caused by the East Asian crisis in 1997-98 and the subsequent
deceleration in the growth of world trade, as well as of the relatively modest
depreciation of the Indian Rupee vis-a-vis the other currencies in the area.
According to the World Bank (see World Bank (2000)), though, the slow-
down in Indian industrial growth is partly due to the exhaustion of the bene-
￿ts of the ￿rst stage of reform, and, importantly, to the slowdown (or outright
reversal) of the pace of economic reform, as India set up new trade restrictions
in 1997-98 and in 1998-99. Among the non-tariﬀ barriers, anti-dumping mea-
sures took on an increasingly crucial role: 103 antidumping measures were
active in 2000, compared to 64 in 1999 and 49 in 1998. The latest IMF
Country Report on India (IMF (2001)) reports that, in 1997-2000, there was
nearly no change in the average tariﬀs rates, although the maximum rate
bound was reduced from 45 to 35 per cent.
Our data set, whose main features are described in the next Section,
provides a ￿rm-level snapshot of the most recent stage of India￿s process of
economic reform.
4A ﬁrst pass at the data
In this section we ￿rst present the main features of our data set and then
look at how labor market outcomes vary across types of ￿rms. Firms are
distinguished according to their degree of foreign exposure.
Our data come from a survey of 895 Indian ￿rms recently collected by
the World Bank. It contains information on ownership structure, investment
and technology, relations with suppliers and government, location, trade,
products and inputs, labor and human resources, assets and liabilities, for
the period 1997-1999.Unfortunately, most data of interest for this study, in
particular the information on promotions and training, are available for 1999
only. Other variables, such as strict production data on inputs and outputs,
are instead available in 1998 and 1997 as well, although only for a smaller
sample of ￿rms.
The ￿r m si n v o l v e di nt h es u r v e yb e l o n gt o￿ve manufacturing sectors:
Garments, Textiles, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (a branch of Chemicals),
Electronic Consumer Goods, and Electrical White Goods (a branch of elec-
trical machinery). The ￿r m sa r el o c a t e di nt h ec i t i e so fA h m e d a b a d( S t a t e
9of Gujarat), Bangalore (Karnataka), Calcutta (West Bengal), Chandigarh
(Punjab), Chennai (Tamil Nadu), Cochin (Kerala), Delhi (Haryana), Hyder-
abad (Andhra Pradesh), Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh), Mumbai and Pune (Ma-
harashtra). The poor central states of Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar,
as well as Rajasthan and other smaller States, are not represented in our
sample.
4.1 Foreign exposure
The ￿rst step for assessing the labor market implications of ￿globalization￿
is to de￿ne how we measure ￿globalization￿ for an individual ￿rm in the
sample. Globalization exposes ￿rms to foreign competition in the product
and capital market. Therefore we use the following two criteria.
As far as the product market is concerned, one would ideally estimate
the elasticity of substitution between the ￿rm￿s product and that of domestic
and foreign competitors. In the absence of detailed information on domestic
and foreign prices and quantities, however, we proceed as follows. A ￿rm
may face foreign competition either on the domestic (if import-competing)
or on foreign (if exporting) markets, or both. As far as foreign markets are
concerned, we de￿ne Exporters (E) all the ￿rms whose revenue share from
exports is greater or equal than 30% (and non-exporters the remaining ones).
In order to capture the pressure of international competition for import-
competing ￿rms, IC, we classify as import competitors all those ￿rms that
declare to face foreign competition in the domestic market (answering ￿yes￿
to the question ￿Are any of the competitors in the domestic market foreign
￿rms ?￿) and that, at the same time, are non-exporters. As our ￿control￿
group, we use the ￿rms who are neither E or IC, so they are ￿protected￿
(P) from foreign competition in the goods market, due to either tariﬀ and
non-tariﬀ barriers or some other ￿natural￿ barrier. They represent about
35% of the total. As a result of this classi￿cation, each ￿rm belongs to one
out of three mutually exclusive categories: E, IC, P.4. The consequences of
competition in the product market are discussed by comparing protected and
non protected ￿rms.
In order to capture a ￿rm￿s integration in the international capital mar-
k e t s ,w eu s et h ed a t ao nt h e￿rm capital ownership. We label as ￿foreign
owned￿ any ￿rm with a strictly positive share of foreign participation in its
capital. Such extensive de￿nition is warranted by the fact that only a small
minority of ￿rms in the sample (4%) declare a foreign participation in its
4Note once again that ￿rms in group E may or may not sell a part of their product in
the domestic market and, in case they do, may or may not face foreign competition also
in the domestic market.
10capital. The drawback is that this de￿nition does not enable us to descrim-
inate multinational corporations from joint ventures. The activity of the
former is often still subject to strict Government regulation. Joint ventures,
in contrast, are often crucial vehicles of globalization as well as new modes
of production and organization, despite the fact that they typically do not
involve massive injection of foreign capital.
A note of caution is warranted here. Some of our variables of interest,
in particular training and promotions, are available just for a subset of ￿rms
(only some 62% of the total) and for 1999 only. This raises the question of
whether the smaller sample - on which we concentrate our attention - distorts
the picture that the large sample would have given. We checked that this
is not the case by comparing the summary statistics of the few variables
for which data are available for both samples. It turns out that they only
marginally diﬀer from the summary statistics computed over the full sample.
Thus we safely concentrate on the smaller sample in most of the analysis.
4.2 Sectors and localities
Table 1 and 2 present a summary of the distribution of the remaining 555
￿rms across the various categories of ￿rms distinguished by sector and lo-
cality. As expected, product market integration is much deeper than capital
market integration. Almost two thirds of the ￿rms in the sample are, one way
or another, exposed to foreign competition. 37% of the total are exporters,
and 27% are import competitors. Foreign capital, by contrast, has a minor
role in the ownership structure of ￿rms: only 4% of the total have foreign
partecipation in their capital.
Table 1 shows that the distribution of ￿rms across the E, IC, P categories
varies greatly across sectors and localities, revealing an interesting pattern
of comparative advantage. Textiles is the only sector with shares of E, IC,
P very close to the sample average. In contrast, garments and electrical
machinery represent polar cases. About 60% of the ￿rms operating in the
former sector are exporters, while most ￿rms in the latter are either protected
or import-competitors. Similarly, a majority of ￿rms declares to be exposed
to foreign competition in Drugs & Pharmaceuticals. Foreign-owned ￿rms
mostly concentrate in Textiles and Drugs & Pharmaceuticals, where they
represent respectively 5% and 7.5% of the total number of ￿rms in each
sector.
Table 2 cross-tabulates our classi￿cation of exposure to foreign compe-
tition against the locality dimension. Two thirds of ￿rms agglomerate in
larger cities (Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai). Each urban area presents a rela-
tively specialized structure of production. Most ￿r m si nD e l h ia r ei nP ,t h e
11protected manufacturing sector. Those in Mumbai are prevalently IC, i.e.
import-competing ￿rms. Roughly two thirds of the ￿rms located in Chennai,
as well as in Hyderabad and Cochin, belong to the E class. Bangalore, the
preferred location for software industry, is also a ￿highly globalized￿ city, with
more than 85% of ￿rms either in the E or the IC groups. Kanpur and Pune
are home to mainly protected ￿rms.5
Finally, most foreign owned ￿rms are located in Delhi (7% of total ￿rms),
but it is in Bangalore, Cochin and Chandigarh where they represent the
biggest shares of total ￿rms (respectively 8%, 18% and 18% of the total
number of ￿rms). No foreign owned ￿rms are sampled in Ahmedabad and
Kanpur.
4.3 Wage and employment levels
Next we compare several labor market features across the various groups of
￿rms. First, we present group-wise summary statistics for the entire sample
and for each group of ￿rms, separately. We also test for the equality of group
means of E and IC ￿rms, separately, versus P ￿rms, and of foreign owned
versus domestically owned ￿rms.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on wages and employment. The
questionnaire provides information as to employment, hours worked and wage
levels for ￿ve groups of workers (non-production workers, unskilled produc-
tion workers, skilled production workers, professionals and managers). We
aggregated the ￿rst three groups into ￿Blue collars￿, and the last two into
￿White collars￿. On average, the hourly earnings of white collars are 7.7
times those of blue collars. The average wage gap is larger in exporting ￿rms
(8.4 times) than elsewhere (7.1 times, both in IC and P ￿rms). Yet Table
3 clearly shows that wages and employment levels do not signi￿cantly dif-
f e ra c r o s sg r o u p so fE ,I Ca n dP￿rms, since the test for equality of group
means is systematically not rejected at the 5% con￿dence level. In other
words, exporting or import-competing ￿rms neither pay ￿exploitation￿ wages
to blue collars, nor ￿superstar￿ wages to white collars. There is instead some
evidence of foreign-owned ￿rms paying white collars less - in absolute and
5The pattern of association between foreign exposure and ￿rms￿ localization is fully
consistent with the ￿ndings in Sachs, Bajpai and Ramiah (2002) and Bajpai (2002), where
access to the sea is found to be an important determinant of the export status of an Indian
￿rm. The cities of Chennai, Hyderabad, Cochin, Bangalore - all located in Southern states
- are close to the sea shores or with easy access to the sea. Delhi and Kanpur are instead
in landlocked states. Pune is in a region of Majarashstra rather far from the Ocean.
Accordingly, exporting ￿rms are less present in these localities. Calcutta and Mumbai are
on the Ocean, but are also huge metropolitan areas, which may explain the large shares
enjoyed by protected ￿rms in these cities.
12relative terms - than domestically owned ￿rms. We conclude that, at least in
our sample, ￿globalization￿ is not associated to systematic ￿rst-order varia-
tion in absolute or relative wage levels.
Table 3 a l s os h o w st h a tt h ea v e r a g es i z eo f￿rm, measured by total
employment, is relatively large (220 workers) in our sample. Hence, in inter-
preting our results, one should be aware that only a small fraction of small
and medium-sized enterprises is represented in our sample. Having said so,
however, within our sample, on average, ￿rm size rises when moving from P
to IC and to E, but this diﬀerence is not statistically signi￿cant at conven-
tional levels. Domestically owned ￿rms only are signi￿cantly smaller than
foreign owned ones.6
4.4 Variability
While wage and employment levels tend to be similar across groups, ￿rms
with greater foreign exposure faces much ￿more variability￿, both across
￿rms and time. Here we look at the variability of prices, wages, employment,
pro￿ts and sales. We construct the ￿rm￿s price variables as indices obtained
from the individual prices of the three main products sold by each ￿rm in each
year. Individual prices are geometrically aggregated using each product￿s
share in sales as a weight. Wages are hourly wages.7 The average number
of hours worked is inferred exploiting information about work shifts, average
hours worked a day and number of days of work in a year. Finally, net
pro￿ts are the before-tax gross operating surpluses net of interest charges,
depreciation and other overhead expenses.
Our measure of variability, say of the ￿rm￿s wage rate, is a mixture of
two separate concepts: the ￿rst is within-group cross-sectional dispersion ;
the second is the time-series deviation of a ￿rm￿s variable from its own 1997-
99 time average. The former measures the eﬀects of idiosyncratic shocks,
resulting, in the example, in wage dispersion across ￿rms. This component is
usually termed permanent volatility. The latter measures the ￿rm￿s volatility
with respect to its own trend, in the example the instability over time of the
￿rm￿s wage rate (transitory volatility). Clearly, we are particularly interested
in the latter, since our aim here is to test wether international integration
makes life ￿more uncertain￿ for an individual ￿rm/worker exposed to more
competition. Therefore, in order to separate the two components, we apply
6Small protected ￿rms also tend to be less capital intensive and less unionized than
those exposed foreign competition
7These are computed as the ratios between the total wages paid by each ￿rm and the
product of the average number of hours worked times the level of employment in each
￿rm.
13a standard decomposition method (see Gottschak and Moﬃtt (1994)).8
Table 4 summarizes the results of our decomposition. Each cell of this
Table reports the transitory and the permanent variance (both as shares of
the total variance) and the coeﬃcients of variation (this latter one referred
to the entire sample). For our purposes what matters is the comparison be-
tween the ￿rst ￿gure in each cell across rows, i.e. a c r o s st h ev a r i o u st y p e so f
￿rms. Exporting (E) ￿rms and, to a less extent, import-competitors (IC) sys-
tematically present higher shares of transitory variances than protected (P)
￿rms. This occurs for wages, employment, prices and sales. The diﬀerence
is instead less marked for net pro￿ts.
Table 5 presents further evidence on the coeﬃcients of variation calcu-
lated over the period averaged values of each variable9 for E, IC and P, as
well as foreign and domestically owned ￿rms. The highest coeﬃcients of vari-
ation are usually observed for foreign-owned ￿rms and, next, for exporters.
T h el o w e s tc o e ﬃcient is instead the one recorded for protected (P) ￿rms.
The equality-of-means tests con￿rms that variability of labor and product
market variables is substantially larger for exporters than for the protected
￿rms. This same result applies to foreign-owned compared to domestically
owned ￿rms. The means computed for IC and P are instead not statistically
diﬀerent from each other.
Altogether, the evidence in Table 4 and 5 provides elements to believe
that ￿globalization￿ is, as expected, associated with higher variability.
4.5 Training and promotions
So far, we found evidence that ￿globalization￿ is not signi￿cantly related to
absolute and relative wages and employment, and is instead closely associ-
ated to more volatile labor and product market variables. So much for the
￿bad news￿ for risk-averse workers and ￿rms. The question here is whether
globalization also brings ￿good news￿. Next we show that the good news is
more training and promotions.
We start from training. In the survey questionnaire, ￿rms are asked ques-
tions as to whether the plant runs formal in-house training for its employees
in 1999 or whether employees were sent to formal training programs run by
other organizations in the same year. In case of aﬃrmative answers, further
questions on the speci￿cs (cost, funding, length, type of workers involved,
8Let wit = ￿i+vit ,r e p r e s e n￿rm i0s wage rate at time t, its permanent (time invariant)
and transitory components , respectively. The variance of wit can be written as the sum
of σ2
￿ + σ2
v.(see Gottschak and Moﬃtt (1994))
9Period averages are computed over 1998 and 1999 for prices, and 1997, 1998 and 1999
f o rt h eo t h e rv a r i a b l e s .
14promotions after the end) of the programs are asked. Yet, while the answers
to the ￿r s tb a s i cq u e s t i o n( w h i c hs i m p l yi n v o l v e saY E So rN O )a r er e s p e c -
tively 549 and 532, sample size shrinks dramatically with the more detailed
questions. Hence we only use a few of them in what follows.
Table 6 (column 1-3) presents summary statistics on the percentage of
￿rms declaring to have trained their workers (third column) in 1999. Some
(but not all) of these ￿rms also describe whether they run formal in-house
programmes or send their workers outside (outside training). It turns out
that about 28% of the ￿rms in our sample have a part of their workers
engaged in training programs, either outside or inside the ￿rm. This ￿gure
is markedly higher for foreign owned ￿rms (77%) than for the other ￿rms in
the sample. However, the diﬀusion of training programs is not con￿ned to
the small elite of workers employed in foreign owned ￿rms: the share is 31%
among the exporters, 36% among the domestic producers exposed to foreign
competition, and falls to only 19% for the group of the protected ￿rms. Both
E and IC means are statistically signi￿cant from the mean of P ￿rms.10
Another useful piece of information is the share of a ￿rm￿s employees
that are involved in training programmes. The fourth column in Table 6
shows the ￿gures. IC ￿rms are by far the most heavily involved in training.
The equality of means test con￿rms this result, although the diﬀerence is
signi￿cant only at the 7% level of con￿dence.
Finally, we show that the higher uncertainty faced by workers of exporting
￿rms ￿nds a positive counterpart in potentially more rapid job careers. The
￿f t hc o l u m ni nTable 6 shows the percentage of a ￿rm employees that were
promoted in the ￿rm￿s ladder in 1999 (the probability of promotion). Here
the striking feature is that workers in exporting ￿rms enjoy a probability of
being promoted of about 4%, twice as much as the sample average and three
times as much as the probability of being promoted in a P ￿rm. In contrast,
the probabilities of rpomotion in IC and P ￿rms are not signi￿cantly diﬀerent
from each other.
We interpret the evidence in this Section as follows. Globalization makes
Indian workers￿ lives riskier, but at the same time it provides, to some, the
incentives (and the means) to face the new challenges: larger investment in
training for ￿rms, and more eﬀort for workers, resulting in a larger probability
of promotions (at least for exporters).
10In multivariate regression, however, this result holds only for the exporting ￿rms, see
below.
155 Regression results
In Section 4, evidence on globalization and labor markets in India - based on
pair-wise comparisons of unconditional means - has been presented. Here, we
check whether and which results are still there when subjected to multivariate
regression conditioning. We start from standard parametric techniques (OLS,
probit estimates) and then move to non-parametric techniques (matching es-
timates). Most of the results in Section 4 withstand conditioning, irrespective
of the estimation method.
5.1 Parametric estimates
5.1.1 Variability
First, we regress our indicators of variability on ￿rms characteristics, and
then we move to training and promotion.
In our ￿rst set of OLS regressions (see Table 7), the dependent variable
is the logarithm of the transitory component of the variance of each variable
(computed in the previous section). This is regressed on the dummies for
E, IC, foreign ownership and controls for size11, sector and localities. We
omit the dummies for protected and domestically owned ￿rms, so that the
￿benchmark/control group￿ relative to which the various coeﬃcients must
be interpreted, is domestically owned and protected ￿rms. When appending
size, sector and locality dummies, we employ the normalization proposed
by Suits (1984) and thus we are eﬀectively taking an ￿average￿ domestically
owned and protected ￿rm as a benchmark in each regression.
The most apparent regularity in Table 7 is that the ￿Exporter￿ dummy
is always signi￿cant and positive for the transitory variances of prices, sales
and pro￿ts. It is also positive but less consistently signi￿cant for employ-
ment. It is never signi￿cant for real (product) wages. This is consistent
with expectations: faced with external shocks, ￿rms may adjust real wages
or employment, sales or pro￿ts, but they don￿t need to adjust both. The size
of the statistically signi￿cant eﬀects may vary dramatically across speci￿ca-
tions, however. To take a speci￿c example, being an exporter raises a ￿rm￿s
transitory variance of sales by 3.8% above that of a protected domestically-
owned ￿rms,12 if no other dummies are appended to the equation. The eﬀect
11A ￿rm is de￿ned ￿small￿ if employment is less than 50, ￿medium￿ between 50 and 200
units, and ￿large￿ when employment is more than 200 units. This conforms to international
standards of classi￿cation.
12These ￿gures obtain bearing in mind that, in semi-log equations, the eﬀect of a dummy
variable on the dependent variable is not directly given by the estimated coeﬃcient β,b u t
rather by eβ-1.
16is bigger, though, as other dummies are appended: it becomes +4.5% with
size and sector dummies and reaches +31% as locality dummies are included
as well. Similar ￿gures obtain for net pro￿ts, while the range of variation
of the pointwise coeﬃcients is smaller for the equation of the variance of
prices. It should be pointed out, however, that, in most cases, locality and
sector dummies as a whole did not pass the F-test of joint signi￿cance, which
suggests that the best speci￿cation may be the basic one.
The results for the eﬀects of foreign ownership and import competition
are less impressive, instead. The foreign ownership and IC dummies are
signi￿cant for all variables at the conventional con￿dence levels, but only in
the basic speci￿cation. When size, sector and locality dummies are included
as regressors, the statistical signi￿cance of the foreign ownership and import
competition coeﬃcients is often lost. The same conclusions on the joint
signi￿cance of sector and locality dummies applies here as well, though.
5.1.2 Training
Next we move to training. First, we estimate a probit model, where the
probability of being involved in a training programme is the dependent vari-
able. This is regressed on our status dummies, E, IC, etc., as well as on
dummies for size, sector, and locality. We also use two continuous controls:
￿rm￿s productivity growth (proxied as the growth of the ratio between total
sales at constant 1998 prices and the total number of employees) and the
amount of tax deductions granted to a ￿rm involved in a training program.
High-growth ￿rms may be more inclined to pay for their employees￿ training.
Access to public funding and subsidies also may make it more likely for a
￿rm to engage in training programs. In Table 8 (row 1-5), the marginal
eﬀect of each variable is reported.13
We start including only our exposure status dummy in the ￿rst regression.
All estimated coeﬃcients are positive and statistically signi￿cant. Taken at
face value, this implies that the probability of entering a training program
for workers employed in exporting and import-competing ￿r m si sa b o u t1 0 %
higher than for workers employed in a P ￿rm than in any other domestically
owned ￿rm. By the same token, this probability would be higher by 50%
in foreign-owned ￿rms. Unfortunately, these results are not very robust to
the inclusion of controls. While productivity growth is never signi￿cant,
￿rms￿access to tax-deductions linked to training programmes is so. When
13The reported coeﬃcients are the outcome of the STATA dprobit procedure, which
directly delivers the probability change originated by an in￿nitesimal change in each in-
dependent continuous variable or, by default, the discrete probability change for dummy
variables.
17we include this dummy in the regressions, the signi￿cance of the E and IC
dummies drops dramatically. The signi￿cance of foreign ownerwhip is instead
not aﬀected. Hence, it looks like that exporters and import competitors are
simply more skillful in exploiting the allowances oﬀered by the tax system
than protected domestic ￿rms, and this may explain their larger investment
in training programmes.
Yet this pessimistic conclusion is partially contradicted by the ￿ndings
reported in the second part of Table 8 , which usefully complement those
in the upper part of the Table. Now the shares of trained workers over em-
ployment is regressed on our usual dummies, as well as productivity growth
and tax-deductions. These latter variables turn out outright not signi￿cant,
however, and are therefore dropped from most speci￿cations. The main re-
sult here is that IC ￿rms tend to train a larger proportion of their workforce
(about 11% more) than domestically owned protected ￿rms, even after con-
trolling for ￿rm size and other controls. This does not extend to exporting
￿rms, nor to foreign-owned.14
5.1.3 Promotions
Finally, we look at promotions. We regress the probability of promotion
on our status dummies and other controls. The results in Table 9 say
that the promotion rate is 2.7% higher for E-￿rms than for all other ￿rms,
including the foreign owned. These ￿ndings survive (see row 2) the inclusion
of a control for productivity growth, which is statistically signi￿cant with a
coeﬃcient of the same size (about 0.02). When we also include a dummy
for size, in the third row, this somewhat reduces the point-wise estimate of
the coeﬃcient (which falls to .020, from .027), although not its signi￿cance.
However, when the dummies for the ￿rm location are included (see the last
row), the coeﬃcient of the E dummy is no longer signi￿cant, as a result
of a further decline in the point-wise estimated coeﬃcient and a roughly
unchanged standard error of the estimate.
A possible explanation, in the spirit of Besley and Burgess (2002), is
that both the probability of promotion and locations capture State-related
regulatory and competitive legislation and practices in the labor market, so
that, for example, workers may be more easily promoted in less-regulated
states, independently of ￿rm export status.
14The slight discrepancy of results between the ￿rst and the second part of Table 8
should come as no surprise. The dependent variable here is a continuous variable only
available for a small subset of ￿rms (about 90, roughly half as much as the observations
employed in the regressions in the ￿r s tp a r to fTable 8).
18While this identi￿cation problem is common to most cross-country growth
regressions literature15, our data does not allow us to tackle this issue.
5.2 Non-parametric estimates
5.2.1 Why
We have shown that our results on the relation between foreign exposure
and a few labor market variables (such as training and promotions) are often
robust to the inclusion of controls for size, sector and locality. The loss
of signi￿cance of foreign exposure in the promotions regressions as sector
and location dummies are appended signals that the exposure status itself
(described as a set of zero-one variables) may in fact depend on such controls.
Would our OLS and probit estimates still be unbiased ? The answer is
yes, under two conditions: recursivity and coeﬃcient linearity. Recursivity
requires the error term of the relation determining the foreign exposure status
be uncorrelated with the error term in the relation determining training and
promotions. Within our data set, however, we can do nothing to relax this
problem: ￿nding reliable instruments in a quasi-cross-sectional framework
such as ours is hard. Linearity is also potentially restrictive. Suppose, as
is likely the case, that exporting ￿rms are systematically located in some
sectors (e.g. textiles) and localities (e.g. Chennai). This introduces a non-
linearity, which, if important, would make OLS estimates severely biased.
This problem can be addressed, however. We can in fact check whether our
OLS results survive under non-parametric estimates, not involving restrictive
functional form assumptions.
Non-parametric methods have been used in the medical sciences at least
since the 1970s. Labor economists (see e.g. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd
(1997)) have used such tools to evaluate labor market and educational pro-
grams. More recently, Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2000) and Persson and
Tabellini (2002, ch.5) have interestingly expanded the set of applications of
such methods to political economics issues (we refer to them for a very useful
discussion of the practical implementation details of such methodologies).
5.2.2 How
We calculated the matching estimators for exporting vs. protected ￿rms as
well as for import-competing vs. protected ￿rms, excluding import-competing
￿rms in the former case and, by the same token, exporters in the latter case.
15Levine and Renelt (1991) discuss the diﬃculties of disentangling the various dimen-
sions of the policy stance of a country.
19We could not run these same exercises for the foreign owned - domestically
owned ￿rms dichotomy, for foreign owned ￿rms are too few in our sample.
In our framework, the implementation of such methods boils down to the
following main steps. Take exporters and protected ￿r m sa sa ne x a m p l e .
First, the propensity score of each ￿rm for each variable of interest must
be estimated. This consists in estimating the probability that each ￿rm is
an exporter rather than a protected ￿rm, and this is done running probit
estimates on a few explanatory variables X.O u r s e t o f X just includes
sector and location. These are the most safely exogenous determinants of
foreign exposure in our sample. The same does not apply, for instance, to
￿rm size and productivity growth, hence we do not use them as controls.
This ￿rst stage is aimed at reducing the initial multi-dimensional diﬀerences
across ￿rms to a single number constrained to be between zero and one.
Based on the calculated values for the propensity scores, the overall sam-
ple is then split into ￿ve groups (or strata). Within each group, the closest
twins, i.e. the exporting and protected ￿rms with the most similar propen-
sity scores, are matched and the diﬀerences between the value taken by the
variable of interest (training, promotion) for the two twins are compared.
This is repeated for all the twins in each group (with the non-closest twins
excluded from the analysis). Then the average diﬀerence within each group
and a group-weighted sample average between exporters and protected are
calculated and contrasted. Borrowing the expression from medical sciences,
this is called the eﬀect of treatment (being an exporter) on the outcome (vari-
ability, training, promotions). A ￿balancing test￿ checks that the propensity
scores are correctly identi￿ed, namely that the means of the explanatory
variables of the propensity scores (sector, locality) do not signi￿cantly diﬀer
across exporting and protected ￿rms in each group. If the balancing property
is rejected, then the partition into groups is probably too coarse and should
be re￿ned.
Note ￿nally that propensity scores should not be explained ￿too well￿: if
the explanatory variables are too successful in predicting the exporter/protected
s t a t u s ,t h e ni tm i g h tb et h ec a s et h a ts o m eg r o u pi sl e f tw i t h o u te i t h e rc a t -
egory, which would make matching unfeasible. This is why we only include
some of the potential conditioning variables. Sector and location are the most
safely exogenous variables in our sample; this is why we included them in the
￿rst instance. The same does not apply to size and productivity growth, in-
stead.16 Adding size controls to sector and locality would not be a good idea,
16As mentioned above, we are aware that this does not fully solve our potential endo-
geneity problem. It may still be the case that some unobserved variables, other than sector
and location, drive both foreign exposure and training or promotions.
20for propensity scores would just be explained too well in this case, thereby
making matching unfeasible. The omission of any other explanatory variable
(e.g. access to tax-deductibility in the training equation) does not invalidate
our results, as long as the omitted variables aﬀect the two categories of ￿rms
equally.
5.2.3 Non-parametric evidence for variability, training and pro-
motions
We calculated separate propensity scores for exporting versus protected ￿rms,
as well as for import-competing versus protected ￿rms. In both cases, con-
ventional t-tests for the equality of the propensity scores of exporters and pro-
tected ￿rms (respectively, import-competitors and protected) indicate that
the balancing property is satis￿ed in each group. This enables us to move
to the second step, namely the matching between the estimated propensity
scores and either training or promotions in both cases. This is done through
the nearest neighbor matching method brie￿y described above. Results are
presented in Table 10 for variability, training and promotions. Bootstrapped
standard errors are reported.
The eﬀects of treatments on variability of employment, prices, sales and
pro￿ts are there for both exporters and import competitors, while those on
either nominal or real wages are not. This squares well with expectations.
Faced with higher output price variability, ￿rms keep real (product) wages
relatively constant and this has a counterpart on the quantity side in the
enhanced variability of employment, sales, and pro￿ts.
The eﬀects of treatments on outcomes are always statistically signi￿cant
for training. Both exporters and import-competing ￿rms tend to train their
workers more often than protected ￿rms. For both groups of ￿rms, training is
10% to 15% bigger than for protected ￿rms and both estimates are signi￿cant
at conventional levels of con￿dence (at the 10% level for exporters, at 1%
for import competitors). As shown in Table 10, matching estimators are
seemingly able to capture the eﬀect of foreign exposure in the product market
more precisely than probit estimates do in standard parametric regressions.
This applies to both import-competing ￿rms and exporters. Relaxing the
linearity assumption improves the signi￿cance of our results.
Finally, the results for promotions tend instead to replicate very closely
those obtained in parametric regressions. Workers in import-competing ￿rms
are not promoted more than workers in protected ￿rms, while workers in
exporting ￿rms enjoy promotion rates higher by about 1.5%, a ￿gure slightly
smaller than in parametric regressions. Yet the much increased standard
error of the estimate makes such result not statistically signi￿cant.
215.3 Summing up on ﬁndings from parametric and non-
parametric estimations
Altogether, parametric and non-parametric methods produce remarkably
consistent results. In turn, our results are broadly consistent with the empir-
ical implications of our simple model in Section 2. It appears that condition-
ing uncertainty, training and promotions to a set of dummy and continuous
variables helps sharpen our story as follows. Workers and ￿rms are exposed
by foreign competition to higher uncertainty (in particular over sales, prof-
its and prices): that￿s the bad news. There are also good news, however,
although they are somehow diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of ￿rms. Workers
in foreign-owned, import-competing and exporting ￿rms bene￿tf r o mm o r e
training. Workers in exporting ￿rms also bene￿tf r o mm o r ep r o m o t i o n s .T h e
results for exporting ￿rms are less robust to changes of speci￿cations than
the results for other groups of ￿rms.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have reached three main conclusions. First, we ￿nd no
evidence that the absolute and relative wages diﬀer signi￿cantly between
globalized and non-globalized ￿ms. Second, we ￿nd that all ￿globalized￿
￿rms are systematically exposed to higher uncertainty (in particular to uncer-
tainty over employment, sales, pro￿ts and prices). Third, exposure to foreign
competition may also be advantageous. Workers in import-competing and
foreign-owned ￿rms mostly bene￿t from more training programs; workers in
exporting ￿rms from being promoted more often. These are the twin eﬀects
of globalization in the labor market, at least in the Indian labor market.
This evidence bears at least one possible explanation. If workers have
limited access to the capital market, when facing higher real income uncer-
tainty, they will invest more in training, eﬀort and productivity in order raise
the probability of a promotion or a wage rise. There may be more. Firms,
facing more competition from abroad, may wish to invest more in training
and human capital, in order to innovate and diﬀerentiate their products, and
save pro￿t margins /market shares (this is the Feenstra and Hanson (200?)
hypothesis). Yet this alternative explanation does not explain why global-
ization does not have an eﬀect on the skill premium, something successfully
confronted with by our eﬃciency-wage-based one.
Do our conclusions extend to other countries ? We do not know yet.
If they do, however, a tentative policy implication might follow. Rodrik
(1998) has shown that globalization is often associated to big government,
22essentially because of the losers￿ demand for protection. Our results can be
interpreted as implying that domestic workers and ￿rms are not necessarily
powerless. Globalization raises insecurity, but also seem to provide workers
with more opportunities. Hence, the design of social assistance programs
should complement and not substitute the private sector response, for exam-
ple giving incentives to private training schemes, thus also helping to avoid
moral hazard problems.
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Table 1. Firm breakdown by foreign exposure and sector 
# Firms Operating in Each Sector 
 





















E (Exporters)                (209) 
 







36 49 20 17 
 
P (Protected against foreign 
competition)                  (196) 
48  60 57 22 9 
 
 
Foreign Owned               (22) 
 
3 13  18  2  2 
Domestically Owned    (511)  240 232  220  62  71 
 
Notes: Exporters  (E) refer to firms whose (total exports) / (total sales) > 30%. Foreign Competition indicates a firm 
declaring to have foreign competitors in the domestic market. 
 
Table 2. Firm breakdown by foreign exposure and location 









Mumbai (Maharashrtra)        127 32  60  35  14  206 
Delhi (Haryana)        141 42  36  63  2  163 
Chennai  (Tamil Nadu)  109 71  11  27  5  136 
Ahmedabad (Gujarat)  22 7  5  10 0  68 
Calcutta (West Bengal)  29 5  8  16 3  58 
Bangalore (Karnataka)   34 13  15  6  4  45 
Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh)  36 21  6 9  2  50 
Kanpur  (Uttar Pradesh)            26 4  2  20 0  47 
Chandigarh (Punjab)  13 6  4  3  4  20 
Pune (Maharashtra)  8 1  2  5 1  18 
Cochin (Kerala)  10 7  1  2  3  14 
All localities  555 209  150  196  22  511 
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Table 3. Employment and wages 
Means for Selected Variables 
 
Sample  




WW / W B  
 




LW / L B  
 
L TOT  
 
3 Categories                  (555) 























E                                     (209) 
















































































































P-values for  Mean Equality 
Test: 


















P-values for Mean Equality 
Test: 
















P-values for Mean Equality 
Test: 


















The asterisk (*) indicates that the means calculated for the two groups of firms are significantly different, at a 5% 
confidence level. 
WW = average hourly wages of White Collars (W); WB = average hourly wages of Blue Collars (B) 
Blue Collars (LB) = Unskilled Production Workers + Skilled Production and Non-Production Workers 
White Collars (LW) = Managers + Professionals.  
The means reported above are computed by trimming right-end tails so as to leave out 2% of the cumulative 
distribution of each variable. By following this method, the following observations have been left out of the sample: 
WB>7, WW >20, Ltot<5000. 
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Table 4: The transitory and permanent variances of wages, 
employment, prices, sales and net profits 
Decomposition of Variance  for Selected Variables 
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Notes: The figures in Table 4 refer to average values. 
2
v σ  is the temporary component of the total variance 
2 σ , while 
2
µ σ  is 
its permanent component. CV is the coefficient of variation, equal to σ / X , being  X  the mean of the distribution.  
The numbers in brackets are the observations employed to compute the variable means. 
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Table 5: The transitory variability of prices, wages, employment, sales, 
net profits 
Coefficients of Variation for Selected Variables 
 
Sample  P 99 98−   W 99 98 97 − −   L 99 98 97 − −   S 99 98 97 − −  
 
Π 99 98 97 − −  
 





















































































Domestically Owned      












P-values for  Mean 
Equality Test: 












P-values for Mean 
Equality Test: 












P-values for Mean 
Equality Test: 













Note: the coefficients of variation reported in Table 5 refer to the transitory component of variability. 
(∗)=  the means calculated for two groups of firms are significantly different, at a 5% confidence level  
P 99 98−  is the average price for the period 1998 – 1999.  W 99 98 97 − −   is the average wage paid in the period 1997-
1998-1999, S 99 98 97 − −  indicates the average sales for the period 1997-1998-1999, Π 99 98 97 − −  indicates the average 
net profits for the period 1997-1998-1999. 
 
Data computed after 2% trimming of right-end tails. The numbers in brackets are the observations employed to 
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Table 6: Training and promotions 
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Foreign Owned          


































P-values for  Mean 
Equality Test: 
 











P-values for Mean 
Equality Test: 
 











P-values for Mean 
Equality Test: 
 














(∗) indicates that means calculated on the 2 groups of firms are significantly different, at a 5% confidence level  
% In-house training indicates the percentage of firms that runs formal in-house training programs.  
% Outside training is the percentage of firms that takes advantage of formal outside training programs.  
% Total training is the percentage of firms that takes advantage of either type of training programs. 
Promotions is the percentage of workers that moved to higher working positions during 1999.  VI
Table 7: Dummy-variable regressions of the transitory component 







































































































































































Yes Yes  431 
 
Notes 
Benchmark in each regression: average firm in the P (protected) group of firms. 
The dependent variable, for each of the 5 equations, is the transitory component of the variances (σ
2
T) of, 
respectively, Wages, Prices, Employment, Sales, Net Profits. 
E, IC and P are dummies for the firm’s foreign exposure status (E=exporter; IC=Import-competing firm; P=firm 
protected from foreign competition). 
Size dummies: ‘Small’ is a dummy taking value=1 if the total number of workers is less than 50. ‘Medium’ is a 
dummy taking value=1 if the total number of workers is greater than 50 and smaller than 200. ‘Large’ is a 
dummy taking value=1 if the total number of workers is > 200.  
Sector dummies: Garments, Textiles, Drugs & Pharmaceutical, Electronic Consumer Goods and Electric White 
Goods. 
‘Yes’ and ‘No’ indicate inclusion or exclusion of the appropriate variable from the regression.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* = coefficient significant at the 10% level of significance 
** = coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance 
*** = coefficient significant at the 1% level of significance   VII








































No  No  No No No .059  402 
Total 
training 


























No Yes  No  No  .183  183 
Total 
training 










No Yes  Yes  No  .228  183 
Total 
training 









No  Yes Yes Yes .289  175 
Trained/ 
Employed 







No  No  No No No .078  90 
Trained/ 
Employed 










No No No .009  73 
Trained/ 
Employed 







No No  Yes  No  No  .211  90 
Trained/ 
Employed 







No No  No  Yes  No  .213  90 
Trained/ 
Employed 







No No  No  No  Yes  N.A.  90 
Notes 
Benchmark in each regression: average firm in the P (protected) group of firms. 
Row 1-5: Probit estimates. The coefficients reported there are marginal coefficients obtained from STATA ‘dprobit’ procedure. Pseudo-R
2 values reported. 
Row 6-10: OLS dummy variables estimates. Adjusted R
2 values reported. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* = coefficient significant at the 10% level of significance 
** = coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance 
*** = coefficient significant at the 1% level of significance   VIII





















































Yes No No N.A.  291 










Yes Yes No  N.A.  291 









Yes Yes Yes N.A.  291 
 
Notes 
Benchmark in each regression: average firm in the P (protected) group of firms. 
Dependent variable: Number of workers promoted in 1999 divided by total employees in 1999. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* = coefficient significant at the 10% level of significance 
** = coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance 
*** = coefficient significant at the 1% level of significance 
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Table 10: The determinants of variability, training and promotions: 
parametric and non-parametric estimates 
  Matching estimates  Parametric estimates 

















































































The results in column (1) are from matching estimates with two sets of controls (Sector and locality 
dummies). Such estimates satisfy the balancing property tests. Bootstrapped standard errors in 
parentheses. 
The results in column (2) are the OLS variability estimates with all dummies of Table 7; the probit 
training estimates from row 5 in Table 8;  the OLS promotions estimates in row 5 of Table 9. 